Repositioning Indonesia: thoughts on the Indo-Pacific by Milner, Anthony
www.ssoar.info
Repositioning Indonesia: thoughts on the Indo-
Pacific
Milner, Anthony
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Milner, A. (2019). Repositioning Indonesia: thoughts on the Indo-Pacific. Journal of ASEAN Studies, 7(1), 58-72.
https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5748
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-64005-9
Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2019), pp. 58-72 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5748 
©2019 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations 
ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic 
Repositioning Indonesia – Thoughts on the Indo-
Pacific 
 
Anthony Milner University of Malaya, Malaysia; University of 
Melbourne; Australian National University, 
Australia 
Abstract 
Indonesia's growth has stimulated new strategic ambitions. One example is the 
conceptualization of a new 'Indo-Pacific' regional structure reaching beyond ASEAN. 
This essay seeks to describe the changing regional and global environment which 
Indonesia today confronts - stressing the faltering of globalization and the 'return of 
history' - and then goes on to examine in some detail current Indonesian thinking on the 
'Indo-Pacific'. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this exercise of transformative 
leadership? While acknowledging that ASEAN has begun to employ the term officially in 
June 2019, there are reasons for caution in further developing an 'Indo-Pacific' vision. It 
is already entangled with attempts to counter China, and also with risky proposals for a 
new regional architecture. Commentators on ASEAN have tended to underestimate the 
creativity with which ASEAN has already incorporated the large Northeast Asian states 
- together with India, the United States and Russia - in its institutions. There is danger 
that 'Indo-Pacific' aspirations might damage ASEAN centrality and, as a result, provoke 
a greater contest for leadership between the major states. ASEAN-led institutions - 
which have emerged organically - reflect the current complexity of the region. They have 
also served Indonesia well - and require strong Indonesian backing. 
Key words: Indo-Pacific, the return of history, regional architecture, ASEAN 
Centrality, and globalization. 
   
Introduction 
Before considering how best to 
reposition Indonesia in the world – and I 
will be looking, in particular, at 
Indonesia’s current Indo-Pacific initiative - 
we need to ask how the world itself has 
been repositioned. One issue must 
concern the progress of globalization.  
Until the mid-20th-century the 
entire Asian region was either under 
European colonial rule or strong Western 
imperial influence. That is how the region 
was structured – with the great centers of 
power in London, Paris, The Hague and 
Washington. After the extraordinary 
conquests by Japan, which effectively 
ended the Western imperial project, Asia 
was quickly drawn into the Cold War. 
Countries lined up as Communist or Anti-
Communist, and some tried to sustain a 
degree of neutrality or equidistance. 
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At the end of the Cold War, in the 
last decade or so of the 20th-century, as is 
often commented, there was a unipolar 
moment – an America-dominated world 
with a sense of globalization not merely 
being economic, but also a globalization of 
ideas. One commentator wrote of the ‘end 
of history’ – the US had won, he 
suggested, with its liberal democratic 
ideology. Communism had been 
annihilated, and Western liberalism had 
the ‘wind in its hair’. This said, there were 
still objections. Dr Mahathir in Malaysia 
and a number of bright Foreign Ministry 
intellectuals in Singapore spoke of ‘Asian 
values’. They said you had to understand 
these values to explain the great economic 
transformation taking place in Asian 
countries – and there was also a need to 
acknowledge Asian values in the political 
arena, and not just insist that all societies 
must develop in the same way. The 
democracy, human rights, and other 
supposed responsibilities of government 
which Westerners have tended to 
advocate, so it was argued, are not 
necessarily universal norms. 
Mahathir even pushed the idea of 
an East Asian Economic Group in 1990, 
saying that if Europeans could have their 
European regionalism, surely Asians 
could have theirs. He was advocating the 
concept of ‘Asia’ or ‘Asian unity’, which 
had been developed by Indian and 
Japanese thinkers from the late 19th 
century. In 1990, however, the Western 
influence was too strong for the Mahathir 
proposal: advocates of APEC (Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation), which had begun 
in 1989, and was an ‘Asia Pacific’ not 
‘Asian’ organization – and one dominated 
by the United States – pushed the 
Mahathir proposal aside. What is more, in 
1997-1998 parts of Asia, including 
Indonesia, entered a terrible financial 
crisis – and, as a result, faced an element 
of ridicule from some Western 
commentators. Where are your Asian 
values now? - was the tone of these 
comments. 
Japan and Australia assisted 
during this crisis – but so did China, 
especially by maintaining the value of its 
currency against the US dollar. APEC, for 
all its promise, was not seen to be helpful, 
and by the end of the 1990s ASEAN 
countries were joining China, Japan and 
South Korea in a new East Asian grouping 
similar to the Mahathir concept of a 
decade earlier - and termed ‘ASEAN Plus 
Three’. Asian countries, in the wake of the 
crisis, had decided to help one another in 
an ‘Asian’ not US-dominated ‘Asia Pacific’ 
organization. In a sense, the ASEAN Plus 
Three initiative was a triumph for the 
century-old ‘Asia’ movement. It could be 
viewed as well as a setback for the process 
of US-led globalization, and an instance of 
a renewed potency of historical forces. 
The Return of History 
In the decades after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, China has been rising in 
wealth and confidence, with the United 
States in relative decline – and the 
competition between these powers has 
been the preoccupation of international 
relations commentary. The change 
underway, however, has concerned far 
more than a shift in power. In one area 
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after another we have been witnessing a 
‘return of history’ which counters the flow 
of globalization. The prospects of a more 
or less homogenous world appear to be 
increasingly weak, and the likelihood of 
developing turmoil is growing. 
President Trump, in rejecting 
“globalism”, has seen the alternative as 
the “doctrine of patriotism” (Sachs, 2018) 
– but there are many other possibilities. 
One consequence of the return of history, 
it might be argued, is that it brings into 
question established ways of thinking 
about international relations issues. The 
framework that is so often employed, of 
course, was designed for a Western world. 
It assumes a society of numerous states, 
locked in struggle with one another, and 
driven by more or less the same motives – 
particularly the quest for power. Seldom 
do Western analysts of foreign relations 
factor in history – or religious and 
philosophic drivers. In a recent book, 
Bilahari Kausikan - the former head of the 
Singapore Foreign Ministry – explained 
that he had studied International 
Relations but after being a diplomat for 
thirty years decided that this training was 
not useful. Its theory, he said, was too 
mechanical – and he found “history, 
literature and philosophy” were “better 
preparations for understanding 
international affairs” (Kausikan, 2016). 
In Asia today, the analyst certainly 
needs to be able to deal with philosophic 
and sociological developments. To speak 
of history in today’s Asian region is not to 
insist that the times are static, or 
backward-looking – rather, historical 
processes seem to be working their way 
forward, drawing from the past but 
tackling current issues and challenging 
dominant ideas. In Indonesia, for instance, 
religious processes in the 18th and 19th 
centuries – Salafi processes described by 
Azyumardi Azra (Azra, 2014) and Merle 
Ricklefs (Ricklefs, 2006) - promoted a 
strengthening of religious observance and 
the specific role of Islamic Law. These 
developments were hindered or 
moderated in the Dutch colonial period – 
as Islamization was also resisted by the 
British on the Malay Peninsula – and one 
aspect of the return of history has been the 
revival of the Salafi movement in recent 
years, as Western influence has waned in 
Southeast Asia. The growing demand 
today for reforming Indonesian society on 
religious grounds has in particular 
entailed trenchant criticism of liberal 
values. 
The Salafi movement is intensely 
modern, not only in the matters it 
addresses, but also in the way it harnesses 
the internet and social media. Research by 
Indonesia’s State Islamic University has 
indicated that Jakarta tweets more than 
any other city in the world, and the rise of 
Islamic religiosity benefits from this 
technological development (Lindsey, 2018, 
pp. 87). 
In what ways, one must begin to 
ask, will changing demands from the 
Islamic community begin to influence 
more sharply how Indonesia – or 
Malaysia – will behave in the international 
sphere? Is it possible that Islamic concepts 
will eventually damage the primacy of the 
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nation state – the man-made, Dutch-
colonial-influenced state - or at least the 
character of that state? Students of ‘inter-
national’ relations might find they need to 
look beyond the state-to-state structure 
when examining future developments in 
the Southeast Asian region. In particular, 
they will need to know how religious 
beliefs may foster forms of community 
and identity that do not sit comfortably in 
national categories. 
To take another example of 
history’s possible role in reconfiguring the 
Asian region, foreign affairs analysts are 
also being challenged by developments in 
the South China sea – and, more broadly, 
in Southeast Asia-China relations. Faced 
with a rising China, some commentators 
have assumed that Southeast Asian 
countries will seek ways to balance 
against that power – that is, they will seek 
allies, such as the United States, Japan and 
Australia, to help them. They are assumed 
to wish to form an anti-China alliance. If 
they do not act in this way – so the 
analysis proceeds - then their other option 
is to appease or bandwagon with China, 
conceding what China wants. Balance or 
bandwagon – these are the stark options 
in this International Relations, Western 
realist, view of the world. But other types 
of approach to inter-state relations are also 
possible – some rooted in historical 
experience. 
There are indications, for instance, 
that present-day Southeast Asia-China 
interaction may be being shadowed by an 
older form of inter-state relations in Asia – 
one offering an alternative to the post-
Westphalian equal-sovereignty structure 
that arose in Europe and was imposed 
across Asia. Although at one level the 
countries of the region today behave as 
sovereign states in an international 
community, at another level both China 
and Southeast Asian countries are 
influenced by pre-modern ideas, 
particularly relating to hierarchy. Given 
the experience of a hierarchical Asian 
world in which many Malay Archipelago 
states looked up to China and other major 
powers, it may be that modern ASEAN 
countries are unusually comfortable today 
in the face of a rising China. The way 
Prime Minister Mahathir – in his August 
2018 visit to China – not only negotiated 
hard with China over economic matters, 
but also talked of Malaysia being only a 
“small” country and expressed respect for 
China’s regional role (Mahathir, 2018), is 
representative of this relaxed approach. In 
Southeast Asia, on the one hand, there 
does not seem to be an automatic reaction 
to balance against China; and, on the 
other, there is no obvious, passive 
acceptance of Chinese demands - no 
subservient band wagoning. 
These countries, it would seem, do 
not want intervention in their domestic 
affairs on the part of China or any other 
major power. They do not want to be 
attacked militarily by China on their islets 
or rocks in the South China Sea. But they 
are open to negotiation. They look at the 
whole range of dimensions in their China 
relationship – and seek not to push China 
back, but to embrace China, attempting 
also to soften its demands. In a sense, 
these countries aim to bring China closer 
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to Southeast Asia, engaging it in ways that 
will bring benefit to Southeast Asia.  As 
they have done for centuries, the 
Southeast Asian leaders seem to be 
seeking a ‘smart accommodation’ with 
China.  Embrace not push-back, working 
with hierarchy not insisting on sovereign 
equality – these are old Indonesian/Malay 
foreign-relations preferences, and they do 
not fit comfortably into the usual 
International Relations way of viewing 
things (Milner, 2017b; Milner, 2017c). 
Let me mention one more case of 
the potency of historical forces in this time 
of structural as well as power transition. 
This is the particular manner in which 
ASEAN has been developing. I stress this 
theme partly because I intend to come 
back to ASEAN when I arrive at the 
question of exactly how Indonesia might 
best position itself in the world. ASEAN 
has much in common with other regional 
organizations – and one feature of recent 
decades is the growing role of regions, 
and not just states, as players in the global 
community. Certain features of ASEAN, 
however, have a local or indigenous 
character. 
At one level the creation of 
ASEAN was just a sensible, practical 
initiative – an initiative that helped bring 
stability to Southeast Asia, and also to 
foster prosperity. At another level, 
ASEAN is the product of specific, Asian 
historic processes – including the late 19th-
century attempts to promote a sense of 
pan-Asian community. Even in the 1940s, 
some Southeast Asian leaders saw the 
promotion of unity in their immediate 
region as a step toward creating a larger 
Asian community. Another local factor 
was highlighted by the Malaysian foreign 
policy leader, Ghazali Shafie. He argued 
that the concept of berkampung or 
‘togetherness’ was deeply rooted in 
Malay/Indonesian societies. He suggested 
too that the bamboo plant had long 
reinforced this value – a single reed, he 
reminded his readers, can be broken by a 
“single gust” of wind, but growing in a 
cluster bamboo can stand firm (Shafie, 
2000, pp. 205-206, 220, 355). ASEAN has 
sought to be such a cluster – and was, in 
part, a result of this seeming instinct for 
uniting together, for gaining strength 
through community-building. 
Another indigenous, historical 
dimension of ASEAN behavior has been 
the assumption – again, almost an instinct 
– that it is appropriate to build friendships 
in any and every direction, and regardless 
of differences in culture and ideology 
(Nazrin, 2018). There is plenty of evidence 
in the early history of the Malay 
Archipelago of rulers doing this – seeking 
to be open, balanced and friendly to all 
sides (Milner, 2015) - and in the case of 
ASEAN it helps to explain why the 
original non-Communist ASEAN 
countries were so willing to incorporate 
the Communist countries, Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, into the grouping. In 
Europe, there were different foreign 
relations traditions, so that today the EU 
remains strongly at odds with Russia. 
A third local feature of ASEAN 
concerns the handling of major powers in 
general, and not just China. Seemingly 
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comfortable in acknowledging their 
weakness with respect to such countries, 
the ASEAN states find ways to maintain 
their autonomy, their room for maneuver 
(and their independence in domestic 
affairs). It is here we see the quest for 
smart accommodation in the region’s 
hierarchy diplomacy. In the old writings 
of the region, the image conveyed by this 
diplomatic ingenuity is that of the wily 
mousedeer (pelandok jenaka), who employs 
all types of tactic to survive among the big 
animals of the forest (Milner, 2016, pp. 33-
36). This ‘small state’ imperative in 
Southeast Asia has been noted by Bilahari 
Kausikan, explaining that the “preferred 
strategy for the countries of Southeast 
Asia [has been] to maximize autonomy by 
keeping options open and maintaining the 
best possible relationship with all the 
major powers” (Kausikan, 2017). In this 
mousedeer ambition, Southeast Asian 
countries seek an “omnidirectional state of 
equilibrium between all major powers that 
allows the countries of the region maximal 
room to maneuver and autonomy” 
(Kausikan, 2017). 
Summing up, I am suggesting that 
the Asian region is not only in flux 
because of shifts in power, especially the 
relative decline of the United States and 
the great growth of China. Despite all that 
was once thought about the likely 
influence of globalization and the coming 
dominance of Western liberal (including 
post-Westphalian) thought, the region is 
now also being destabilized by a return of 
history - influencing in complex ways the 
behavior of different regional states. It is 
not that the region is moving backward; 
rather, historical forces are impacting on 
state behavior, moving that behavior 
beyond the familiar nation-state and inter-
state structure – underpinned as it has 
been by liberal values, and established by 
Western powers primarily in the 19th 
century. The emerging reconfiguration of 
Asia is unlikely to replicate closely pre-
Western structures; still, it will probably 
entail the working out of historical forces 
that go far more deeply than Dutch, 
British and United States influence. 
The change underway in Asia 
today, therefore, can be expected to be 
about the ‘rules of the game’ – the way the 
region is structured, the manner in which 
the different players are constituted, and 
the changing preferences and anxieties of 
the players. We might ask what exactly 
‘ASEAN’ might mean in 30 years, or how 
a China-centered region might operate – 
or even how ‘Indonesia’, ‘Malaysia’ or 
even ‘China’ itself might be understood as 
units in the regional and global 
configuration. One thing is clear, this is a 
time to think very carefully about policy 
innovation, considering carefully all 
possible implications or consequences. 
The Positioning of Indonesia 
Having set this scene, let us return 
to the positioning of Indonesia. In the 
midst of all this change, Indonesian 
leaders – as one might expect – have been 
doing some hard thinking. Noting that 
Indonesia has been growing steadily – 
with predictions that the country will 
become a major world economy in the 
next couple of decades – some in the 
country’s leadership have been tempted to 
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see Indonesia’s future lying beyond 
ASEAN. There has been talk of ASEAN 
not as ‘the’ cornerstone of Indonesian 
foreign policy (as it continues to be in 
Malaysia’s case), but as ‘a’ cornerstone 
(Natalegawa, 2018, pp.  108, 149). Also, the 
Government has come up with the idea of 
Indonesia as a “global maritime fulcrum”. 
Exactly what is meant by a ‘global 
maritime fulcrum’ remains somewhat 
unclear. It does highlight the large 
maritime dimension of the Indonesian 
state – of Indonesia’s national territory – 
but it also suggests an ambition for 
Indonesia to exercise strategic weight 
beyond Southeast Asia. Such weight, of 
course, would require the development – 
the substantial development – of 
Indonesian naval power (White, 2018, pp. 
18).  
Another way in which Indonesia 
has been reaching beyond ASEAN is in 
the focus being given in recent years to the 
‘Indo-Pacific’ idea – a term relatively new 
to the region and one which, after much 
hesitation, has begun to be employed in 
ASEAN meetings. This ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
focus is of added interest right now 
because of the importance the concept is 
being given in United States, Japanese, 
Indian and Australian strategic 
deliberations. In Indonesia, the current 
President and Foreign Minister have been 
thinking aloud about what ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
might mean, and former Foreign Minister 
Marty Natalegawa, in a recent and 
thoughtful book (Natalegawa, 2018) has 
reminded the international affairs 
commentariat that Indonesia has been 
developing an ‘Indo-Pacific’ agenda from 
a relatively early date – at least since 2004. 
There are problems, however, with the 
Indo-Pacific project - including in terms of 
Indonesian interests – and these suggest it 
may be unwise to re-position Indonesia in 
this direction. 
According to Marty, the Indo-
Pacific idea was an aspiration when 
Indonesia lobbied to involve India – and 
also Australia and New Zealand – in the 
East Asia Summit (EAS), which first met 
in 2005 (Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 89). By 
contrast, Malaysia and some other states 
wished to keep the Summit to East Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea), 
in addition to ASEAN countries. Marty 
has also written about his efforts to create 
an ‘Indo-Pacific Treaty’ – an agreement, a 
set of rules for the Indo-Pacific region. 
True, he says it would be influenced by 
ASEAN’s long-established Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) - the treaty 
which every country participating in the 
EAS has to sign - and also by the 2011 EAS 
Bali Principles, with their stress on 
peaceful settlement of disputes 
(Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 154). Nevertheless, 
having a specific Indo-Pacific Treaty, in 
Marty’s analysis, would move relations 
among the region’s states beyond the 
current ASEAN ‘hub and spokes’ 
structure – the ASEAN Plus X, Y and Z 
structure. An Indo-Pacific Treaty would 
be more than an agreement between 
ASEAN and each of these external 
countries. It would be an independent 
code for the whole Indo-Pacific region. 
(Amitav, 2014, pp. 12-13). This does not 
mean explicitly that Indonesia would be 
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pioneering a new regional organization, a 
new community – standing separately 
from ASEAN, and larger than ASEAN or 
even than ASEAN Plus Three. 
Nevertheless, having such a treaty, a code, 
it seems to me, could be seen as the basis 
for a new ambitious grouping – and a 
grouping, it must be said, in which 
ASEAN centrality might be seriously 
threatened. 
Statements from the current 
Indonesian Administration do strengthen 
the view that a new regional architecture 
is being seriously considered. The 
President referred to an “Indo-Pacific 
regional architecture” when in India in 
February 2018 (Laksamana, 2018). His 
Government has also highlighted the 
aspiration of an “Indo-Pacific Cooperation 
umbrella” (Foreign Minister Retno 
Masurdi in Laksamana, 2018). A Djakarta 
Post article referred to the “new regional 
grouping concept” (13 April 2018). 
The Indo-Pacific Concept 
There are several reasons for 
caution regarding the Indo-Pacific project 
– and they suggest that it may not be the 
right concept for this era. First, the Indo-
Pacific initiative has been hijacked by the 
United States and others, and this will be 
hard to reverse. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ can 
easily be decoded as an anti-China move – 
partly because of the way it is deployed in 
the 2017 US National Security Strategy, 
and also the fact that the American naval 
command in the region is now the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ not ‘Pacific’ Command. The Indo-
Pacific has also been linked to the so-
called Quadrilateral, the moves toward 
security cooperation between India, Japan, 
Australia and the United States - a 
cooperation said to be based on a common 
commitment to democratic values 
(Wanandi, 2018; Bowie, 2918). Some 
commentators have been quite frank 
about the Indo-Pacific’s potential China 
diluting power (Heydarian, 2018). 
One difficulty with this strategic, 
China-encircling concept of Indo-Pacific is 
that it is currently uncertain just how 
strongly committed the lead Quadrilateral 
countries happen to be. The United States 
leadership, as has often been observed, 
has made clear that it cannot be trusted to 
commit to any medium- or long-term 
international engagement. India has 
certainly displayed interest in the Quad, 
but is known to look in many directions, 
exploring one possibility after another. At 
present, it is not just contemplating the 
China-led Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization but has actually joined as a 
full member. Also, the structure of India’s 
armed forces does not suggest the country 
has a strong maritime Indo-Pacific 
capacity. As for Japan, there has clearly 
been progress in working relations with 
China, and optimism as well about 
prospects for the three-cornered – China, 
Japan, South Korea – meetings. So, it is not 
clear how seriously Japan would now 
commit to an anti-China alliance. 
Another difficulty with the 
strategic construction of the US Indo-
Pacific project is that it is so antagonistic 
toward China that some Southeast Asians 
countries and others have become anxious 
about undermining relations with their 
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leading trading partner. It does not help 
that the trading importance of the United 
States tends to have been much 
diminished over the last two decades. As 
noted already, Southeast Asian countries 
have a very long history of engaging 
effectively – of seeking smart 
accommodation - with China, and it 
would seem that they can live with the 
idea of China being at the top of a regional 
hierarchy, so long as Chinese demands do 
not become oppressive. In this sense, the 
return of history which I have discussed 
above with respect to hierarchical (and 
mousedeer) diplomacy does not mesh 
comfortably with the idea of supporting a 
balance-of-power alliance against China. 
Furthermore, it is quite against ASEAN 
tradition – as also noted above – to form 
alliances on an ideological basis. 
Having made these points, it must 
be acknowledged that Indonesian 
proponents of the Indo-Pacific see some of 
this danger. The President has insisted 
that ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ would 
include not exclude China (Shekhar, 2018). 
Also, Marty – certainly among the leading 
ideas-formulators in modern Southeast 
Asia - has made clear that he seeks only a 
“dynamic equilibrium” and “common 
security in the indivisibility of peace”, not 
Cold War-type efforts to contain China 
(Natalegawa, 2017). Despite these 
reassurances, however, it may be difficult 
in the developing international discourse 
to rescue the Indo-Pacific idea – to gain 
priority for the Indonesian inclusive 
conceptualization and succeed in 
disentangling the idea from United States 
strategic ambitions. 
A second reason for caution 
regarding the Indo-Pacific idea is that 
creating a new architecture or grouping 
would open up the question of regional 
leadership – an issue that the ASEAN 
hub-and-spokes framework was 
brilliantly successful in setting aside, and 
in many ways to the advantage of the 
major as well as minor states. A debate 
over leadership could make the Indo-
Pacific an arena for contest rather than 
trust-building; the ASEAN-led 
institutions, frustrating as they can 
sometimes be for those who prefer 
decisive action, have actually provided a 
forum for peaceful and often collaborative 
deliberation. The insistence that it is 
ASEAN that provides leadership has 
helped overcome the danger of regional 
architecture exacerbating rather than 
softening inter-state tension. 
The threat to ASEAN 
A third reason to be wary of the 
Indo-Pacific concerns the interests of 
ASEAN itself. An obvious problem with 
the Indo-Pacific initiative – even in its 
specific Indonesian formulation – is the 
damage it might do to ASEAN. Marty has 
sought to allay such fears. He insists that 
the Indo-Pacific had its origin in ASEAN 
processes, and emphasizes that an Indo-
Pacific Treaty would be based on ASEAN 
principles (Cook, 2018) He and others also 
argue that the Indo-Pacific should be 
ASEAN-led, (Wanandi, 2018; Cook, 2018), 
and Marty insists the Indo-Pacific is in fact 
an opportunity for ASEAN to display 
much-needed “transformative” leadership 
(Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 233-234). The 
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ambition, evidently, is to have ASEAN 
continue to be the force that sets the rules 
in the Asian – or rather, Indo-Pacific - 
region. But in moving beyond the ASEAN 
hub-spoke - ASEAN Plus - structure, 
would ASEAN leadership perhaps 
become less not more secure? The Indo-
Pacific meetings would be likely in the 
long run to replace the East Asia Summit, 
and as a result this equal-footed, treaty-
based Indo-Pacific Cooperation could 
sound the death-knell of ASEAN-centered 
regionalism? 
In an Indo-Pacific grouping with 
its own “framework” – even if that 
framework is based on ASEAN principles, 
an ASEAN rule-code – ASEAN as a 
regional player is highly likely to lose its 
pre-eminence in competition with one or 
more major powers. An Indo-Pacific 
Treaty which in effect gives “countries of 
the wider region”, the Indo-Pacific region 
(Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 234), 
independence from ASEAN, and forms 
the foundation of an ‘Indo-Pacific 
architecture’ or ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’, 
could lead to the peripheralizing of 
relatively weak states - such as the 
member states of ASEAN, including 
Indonesia. Marty states his long-held view 
that “power dynamics between the 
member countries” of “an enlarged non-
ASEAN EAS” would “gravitate towards 
‘equilibrium’, with ASEAN as its core - 
constantly working to maintain the 
equilibrium” (Natalegawa, 2018, pp. 90). 
In fact, it can be claimed that the current 
regional architecture – ASEAN, ASEAN 
Plus Three, the ASEAN-led East Asia 
Summit and so forth – has been 
remarkable in giving ASEAN a degree of 
leadership in a wide region of mega-
powers, some of which are vastly stronger 
than any ASEAN country. 
Marty writes powerfully about the 
need for ASEAN to demonstrate 
leadership, and with a “transformative 
outlook” (Natalegawa, 2018, pp.  232) - 
and he is right to note that such an 
outlook has been evident in the past. 
ASEAN’s record, however, needs much 
highlighting. International Relations 
analysis often gives too little attention to 
the complexity of the task of region–
building. Even in the case of the concept 
of ‘Europe’ it is necessary to explore in 
depth the different forms of influence, 
experimentation and dialogue – over 
many centuries - that helped forge the 
‘European Union’ as it is today (Pagden, 
2002). For the weaker states of Southeast 
Asia, to have led in the formation of a 
regional architecture – and a regional code 
of inter-state behavior - that now not only 
covers the whole of East Asia but also 
engages India, the United States, Russia 
and others, is an immense achievement; 
and  Marty himself has been a very 
significant player in the ASEAN 
leadership. The ASEAN architecture has 
almost been a sleight of hand. In the best 
tradition of ASEAN small-power, 
mousedeer diplomacy it has helped to 
give the relatively weaker Southeast Asian 
countries a significant degree of strategic 
‘space’ (as Marty has put it), or 
‘autonomy’ (to use the term Bilahari 
Kausikan has been employing). 
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ASEAN has moved gradually, step 
by step, sensitive to historical and cultural 
forces, drawing in some ways on the spirit 
of ‘Asia’ promoted over the last century. It 
has paid attention not only to the 
functional dimension of regionalism – the 
establishing of practical cooperation in 
security and economic areas – but also to 
the identity aspect of regionalism. Its 
leaders have been working to create a 
‘People-Centered ASEAN’ and have 
spoken of ASEAN “coursing through our 
veins” (Milner, 2016, pp. 16). They want 
ASEAN to have meaning for the people it 
encompasses. This is an organic 
understanding of regional community – 
and one which invokes indigenous 
thinking about inter-polity relations 
(including Ghazali Shafie’s identifying of 
the bamboo cluster as a powerful 
metaphor). Such an organic 
understanding is influential in the Asian 
region. Even the local vocabulary of 
regionalism – the precise Asian-language 
terms used for regional ‘association’ or 
‘community’ – tend to convey this emotive 
quality. Here we encounter a fourth 
reason for hesitation regarding the Indo-
Pacific project – that is the problem that 
the Indo-Pacific seems to project no 
emotive value. 
It has proved hard enough to 
foster an ‘Asia’ or ‘ASEAN’ sentiment, 
and still harder to win emotive support 
for the ‘Asia Pacific’ (Lee & Milner, 2014, 
pp. 209-228; Milner, 2017a, pp. 39-48). The 
idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’ happens to be one 
further remove from the experienced 
reality of most people living in the Asian 
region. It is not just its geographical and 
historical reach – seeking to incorporate a 
range of societies that have very little in 
common. ‘Indo-Pacific’ also possesses no 
historical authenticity whatsoever. As 
Jusuf Wanandi has pointed out, the term 
actually excludes the word ‘Asia’ – which 
covers “the most important part of the 
region” (Wanandi, 2018). The idea of 
‘Asia’, as we have seen, is itself a construct 
– though one that has been developed 
carefully over a century and more – and 
‘Indo-Pacific’, highlighting only two 
oceans, merely drowns out this historical 
process. This is an affront to the many 
Asian thought leaders – not merely in 
China but across the region – who have 
taken seriously the concept of ‘Asia’ and 
‘Asian’ priorities. 
‘Indo-Pacific’, it could be argued, is 
a project more suited to an earlier era – a 
time when globalization seemed to be able 
to sweep aside local, indigenous and 
history-based sentiment, and when 
political leaders felt few limitations when 
formulating new visions. It tended to be 
accepted at that time that we all live in 
‘imagined communities’ (to use Benedict 
Anderson’s phrase) and that the potential 
for imagination is almost endless. Today, 
as I suggested in the opening section of 
this chapter, we are witnessing the 
development of Chinese, Islamic and 
Southeast Asian experiments that do not 
deny – but rather respond to or build 
upon a range of historical (including 
religious) perspectives. 
With an eye to those current 
ideational developments in the Asian 
region – the growing attack on liberalism, 
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the questioning of the secular state, the 
apparent willingness to accept some form 
of Beijing-centered hierarchy, the apparent 
transcending of balance-of-power 
imperatives, and so forth – a final caution 
regarding the Indo-Pacific concerns 
whether a specifically ‘Indo-Pacific’ forum 
is likely to be the best venue for 
deliberating such matters. Will the urgent 
issues to be faced in the Asian region – 
grounded as they are in local as well as 
global dynamics – be handled effectively 
in a regional structure that could well be 
preoccupied with United States reactions 
to Chinese or Russian challenges? 
Furthermore, as argued above, some 
current thinking about foreign relations in 
the Asian region is not only shaped by 
local imperatives but actually challenges 
the conceptual categories employed so 
often by Western analysts. 
Such clashes of understanding as 
well as aspiration might best be handled 
in the patient processes of ASEAN-led 
bodies, cultivated over many decades. In 
an Indo-Pacific architecture – which might 
potentially operate more or less 
independently of ASEAN, and probably 
be dominated by rivalry between global 
powers - discussion of current issues, 
shaped by the return of history, might be 
characterized by frustration, confusion 
and irritation. 
Marty argues that to “remain 
relevant and central” ASEAN should 
support the Indo-Pacific initiative 
(Wanandi, 2018; Cook, 2018). In fact, there 
is a possibility that doing so could 
undermine the delicate region-building 
which ASEAN has been undertaking since 
1967 – a type of regionalism that may, in 
fact, be more appropriate in the current 
era. 
Putting aside the ultimate merits 
or otherwise of the Indo-Pacific vision, the 
task of implementing it may itself have the 
potential to divide ASEAN – something 
which the organization has taken such 
pains to avoid. Discomfort with the Indo-
Pacific idea was certainly expressed in a 
number of ASEAN quarters over the last 
year – for instance, at the ASEAN 
Summits with India and Australia 
(Chongkittavorn, 2018; Bowie, 2018). In 
June 2019, ASEAN – after much 
prevarication, pressure and hesitation” - 
decided to “acknowledge the ‘Indo-
Pacific’”, while insisting that it merely 
“reinforces the ASEAN-centered regional 
architecture” (Thu, 2019). To go beyond 
acknowledgement and develop the 
concept in detail is likely to inspire further 
debate within ASEAN, along lines 
suggested above – and Marty himself has 
highlighted the need to maintain ASEAN 
“unity and cohesion” (Natalegawa, 2018, 
pp. 229) The bamboo clump, it needs to be 
recalled, must be truly a ‘clump’. 
Conclusion 
Getting back to the title of this 
essay, ‘Repositioning Indonesia’, my 
conclusion is that in this time of regional 
transition – a transition not just of power 
but of ways of thinking about the regional 
order, and a transition to some extent 
running against globalization – the best 
option for Indonesia might not be to 
‘reposition’. What could be more 
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appropriate in this era is to reaffirm 
Indonesian commitment to ASEAN unity, 
and to ASEAN-centered regional projects. 
Marty is subtle in portraying the Indo-
Pacific as consistent with the search for 
‘dynamic equilibrium’ – which is not the 
same as “containment of a particular 
power” but the Indo-Pacific project has 
been hijacked to a large extent by Western 
policy-makers, driven by balance-of-
power calculations, and is in any case a 
concept of region far removed from 
current, everyday experience in the Asian 
region. Indo-Pacific architecture, in fact, 
might turn out to be better suited to the 
late 20thcentury, not the 21stcentury. The 
leaders of ASEAN have been working 
hard to develop a meaningful regionalism 
– and have also harnessed that 
regionalism to the task of giving Southeast 
Asians at least some centrality in the 
wider Asia. Focusing sharply on the 
ASEAN project might still be the best 
option for Indonesia. 
Finally, the idea that Indonesia 
could be better off acting independently of 
ASEAN – is difficult to take seriously. 
True, Indonesia is growing fast, but in 
economic and military terms it is still far 
behind the United States, China, Japan 
and India. Operating alone, Indonesia 
would be less likely than it is now – 
working as the lead member of ASEAN – 
to maintain some pre-eminence in an 
Indo-Pacific forum. Helping to give 
transformative leadership to ASEAN – 
helping to maintain the momentum of 
ASEAN’s relationship-building endeavors 
from India right across to Russia and the 
United States, might be Indonesia’s best 
option in this region, and this particular 
age. 
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